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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past ten years the health industry has been in the grip of a
malpractice "crisis." Among crisis-watchers there is little agreement as to
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. B.A. (Law) 1975,
Kingston Polytechnic; LL.M. 1976, University of Cambridge. I would like to express
my thanks to Doreen Dodson, Ellen Edwards, Ben Ely, Stephen Ringkamp, Dennis
Tuchler and Michael Wolff for their helpful suggestions and criticisms, and to Bart
Sullivan, Kate Whitby and Mary Landholt for their research and editorial assistance.
Author's Note: This article was written in the three and a half weeks following
the passage of Missouri's new malpractice statute. With the considerable cooperation
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the cause of this phenomenon. Health care provider groups point to massive
increases in, and still escalating, malpractice insurance rates' and a conse-
quent rise in health costs. They see a legal system which has failed to rein
in the excesses of the jury system, frivolous suits on the rise, and the health
industry being forced to adopt costly, defensive medicine. 2 Not surprisingly,
patient advocates see things somewhat differently. For them the increase in
malpractice litigation has been the necessary substitute for a lack of effective
provider self-regulation aimed at improving the quality of health care. Fur-
ther, the patient advocate, although conscious of rising health care costs, is
convinced neither that insurers have raised their premiums solely because of
increased malpractice litigation nor that such increased premiums have had,
in percentage terms, the major impact claimed on the general increase in
health care costs. 3
Whatever the merits of either provider or patient arguments, the last
few years have seen a discernible shift in the focus of the malpractice crisis
debate. It is now apparent that most state legislatures both have accepted as
fact that a crisis exists and become receptive to proposals for curative leg-
islation designed to roll-back patient rights in the malpractice claim context.4
Missouri's new malpractice act is an example of such a legislative re-
sponse. It does, however, have a unique feature. Rather than being the
product of a bitter and public struggle between doctors' and lawyers' self-
interest groups, it was a negotiated compromise. That such a concord was
possible says much for both professions. It seems ironic, though, that on
the very day the new Missouri act was signed into law, an American Bar
of the Board of Editors of the Missouri Law Review its publication was expedited
to give a preliminary analysis of the statute's background, provisions and possible
interpretative and constitutional problems. At a late stage in the drafting of this
article, the Supreme Court of Missouri handed down its opinion in Strahler v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). Some comments as to the implica-
tions of that opinion have been incorporated.
This article could not have been written without the encouragement and crit-
icisms made, and the resources provided by, Professor Saul Boyarsky, Chairman, St.
Louis Metropolitan Medical Society, Medical-Legal Committee. I owe him my deepest
gratitude. The errors that remain and the opinions expressed are mine alone.
1. For Missouri statistics, see Missouxu GovERuNoR's TASK FORCE ON HEALTH
CARE COSTS 34-36 (1984).
2. See, e.g., the comments of Dr. Harry 0. Cole, the then president of St.
Louis Metropolitan Medical Society, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 14, 1985 at 5A,
col. 1.
3. See generally Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Mal-
practice Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 571, 575-77 (1986).
4. For summaries of such crisis legislation, see Abraham, Medical Malpractice
Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489 (1977); Comment, An Analysis
of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1417; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TuL.
L. REv. 655 (1976).
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Association (A.B.A.) committee recommended the complete rejection of the
American Medical Association's proposals for malpractice law reform., Un-
wittingly endorsing the work of their Missouri colleagues, however, the A.B.A.
House of Delegates, while adopting their committee's report, also exhorted
the two professions to "cooperate in seeking common solutions to these
problems." '6
The purpose of this article is to detail the background to the passage of
the new statute, to undertake a preliminary analysis of the purpose and
possible interpretations of the provisions to be found therein, and to suggest
some of the constitutional issues that may arise for decision.
II. Missoumi's FIRST "CRISIS" LEGISLATION
Missouri's first response to the malpractice crisis was legislation enacted
in 1976. Typical of 1970's responses to the "crisis," the legislature introduced
a new medical malpractice statute of limitation which utilized an occurrence
accrual date,7 established a pretrial screening panel,8 and prohibited the in-
clusion of any dollar figure in medical malpractice ad damnum clauses. 9
Respectively, these provisions were designed to assist insurers in calcu-
lating premiums by reducing the long "tail" of claims, to screen out un-
meritorious claims while encouraging settlement of meritorious ones, and to
minimize unfavorable publicity when claims were filed.
The Missouri reforms were an appropriately muted response to the "first"
crisis of the 1970's. Moreover, their conservative nature well befitted a ju-
risdiction that had eschewed any daring doctrinal developments in medical
malpractice law.' 0
III. CRIsis LEGISLATION BEFORE TBE MissouRi COURTS
Inevitably, Missouri's second "crisis" legislation will be subject to con-
stitutional challenge. Until the recent decision in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hos-
5. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
6. 54 U.S.L.W. 2415, 2416 (Feb. 18, 1986); see also St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Feb. 12, 1986, at IA, col. 6.
7. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.140 (1978), already utilized an occurrence rule.
Section 516.105 widened the description of medical care providers benefiting, and
introduced a special discovery rule for "foreign objects" cases, a tolling provision
for minors and a ten year statute of repose in all cases. Id. § 516.105.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 538.010-.080 (1978) (repealed 1984).
9. H.C.S.H.B. 1307, 78th General Session, amending Sup. CT. R. 55.06 (May
12, 1976).
10. For a general primer on Missouri law, see Schwartz, The Law of Medical
Malpractice in Missouri, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 397 (1984).
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pital," Missouri Supreme Court review of the first crisis legislation resulted
in a draw. The argument could be made that the total bar resulting from a
restrictive statute of limitations is deserving of a harsher fate than the de-
laying/chilling approach of a pretrial panel.' 2 Nevertheless, in Ross v. Kansas
City General Hospital and Medical Center,13 the Missouri Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of Missouri's medical malpractice statute of lim-
itations, whereas the year before in State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial
Hospital for Children v. Gaertner,4 the court had struck down Missouri's
pretrial review panel.
The majority opinion in Cardinal Glennon5 relied solely on a finding
that the pretrial procedure violated Missouri's guarantee of access to the
courts.' 6 For Judge Simeone, concurring, the requirement that a judge be a
member of the Professional Liability Review Board also violated Missouri's
constitutional separation of powers. ' 7 In Ross such challenges obviously were
not applicable. Instead, due process and equal protection violations were
alleged. As to the former, the supreme court held that a statute of limitations
only denied due process if "the time allowed for commencement of the action
and the date fixed when the statute commences to run are clearly and plainly
unreasonable."' 8 With regard to the equal protection claim, the only clas-
sification complained of was the disparate treatment afforded between mal-
practice victims generally and "foreign object" malpractice victims.' 9 Since
there were several rational explanations for that particular classification, the
court did not even address the appropriateness of "crisis" legislation.
20
Indeed, of the members of the court who decided Cardinal Glennon and
Ross it was only Chief Justice Morgan in his dissenting opinion in Cardinal
Glennon who addressed the "crisis" issue and gave any indication as to how
the Missouri Supreme Court would deal with, for example, an equal pro-
11. 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). Strahler is considered infra notes 198,
207-11, and accompanying text.
12. See generally Terry, Missouri Statute of Limitations and Wrongful Birth,
29 ST. Louis BAR J. 24, (1983) (correction reprint). See also Bartimus, Kavanaugh
& Sullivan, Protecting Plaintiff's Rights in the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 53 UMKC
L. REV. 26, 33-35 (1984).
13. 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). Quaere: following the majority
approach in Strahler would Ross be decided differently today? Surely the argument
could be made that a woman who discovers her pregnancy more than two years after
a tubal ligation apparently was performed is as effectively barred from access to the
courts as the minor in Strahler.
14. 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). See generally Comment, Alternatives
to Litigation: Pretrial Screening and Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Has
Missouri Taken a Giant Step Backward?, 50 UMKC L. REv. 182 (1982).
15. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 110.
16. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
17. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 111-12 (Simeone, J., concurring).
18. Ross, 608 S.W.2d at 400.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (1978) utilizes an occurrence accrual date for
general claims, but a discovery rule for "foreign object" claims.
20. Ross, 608 S.W.2d at 399-400.
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tection challenge premised on an irrational classification of medical mal-
practice victims as distinct from tort victims generally. According to the Chief
Justice:
The crisis created by medical malpractice claims is widely known....
The crisis which the legislation seeks to meet is not directly that facing
the medical profession nor its insurers, but it is the threatened effect upon
the health and welfare of the public caused by the threat to the deliverability
of health care services.
The increased cost of health care to the citizens of this and other states
is already of grave concern. 22
Not only did the Chief Justice make reference to a presumption about the
validity of such legislation, but he considered the pretrial panels system to
have been "a rational means for discouraging frivolous claims and encour-
aging settlement of malpractice claims."
'22
IV. Ti CONCORD-BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATIONS
Missouri's health care providers began to lobby in earnest for second
generation crisis legislation in 1985, at the beginning of the first session of
the 83rd General Assembly. The providers followed, inter alia, the "Action
Plan" drawn up by the American Medical Association. 23 These lobbying
efforts produced four bills. Collectively, these bills ensured the confidentiality
of the proceedings and findings of peer review committees,2 4 the abrogation
of the collateral source rule,25 a periodic payments scheme, 26 and a cap on
noneconomic damage awards. 27 The peer review bill continued on its solitary
way through the legislative process and was passed by the General Assembly
on the final night of the legislative session.
28
By March of 1985 the other proposed reforms had become the subject
of a Senate Insurance Committee Substitute Bill (S.C.S. For S.B. No. 126).
21. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 117 (Rendlen, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE: ACTION PLAN (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
ACTION PLAN]. The ACTION PLAN also was published in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN
THE 80's REPORT 3, 9-16 (March 1985). The ACTION PLAN recommended legislative
strategies and the types of legislative reforms encouraged by the AMA.
24. H.B. No. 357, 83rd General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985). In effect this bill
was designed to overturn the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). See Note, The Missouri
Rule: Hospital Peer Review is Discoverable in Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 Mo. L.
REV. 459 (1985).
25. S.B. No. 7, 83rd General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985).
26. S.B. No. 49, 83rd General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985).
27. S.B. No. 126, 83rd General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985).
28. MSMA, LEGISLATIVE REPORT (June 17, 1985) H.B. No. 357, as enacted,
was codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035(4) (Supp. 1986).
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Senate Bill 12629 was aimed exclusively at the issue of damage quantum. If
passed, it would have introduced a $350,000 cap on punitive damage awards,30
a similar cap on compensatory noneconomic losses 3 and a periodic payments
scheme for future damages in excess of $50,000.32 While the periodic payment
scheme proposed would have allowed for a subsequent reduction 33 or
cessation 4 of such future payments, increases in future payments were limited
to economic damages and the maximum amount of any such increase was
consumer price index-linked."a Unsurprisingly, S.B. No. 126 was supported
by the then president of the St. Louis Metropolitan Medical Society,36 but
described by the Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys as "inevitably
lead[ing] to the destruction of the rights of the public when the horror of
serious malpractice strikes." '37
Despite the lobbying efforts of the Missouri State Medical Association
(MSMA) 38 and Medical Defense Associates (MDA),39 Senate Bill 126 was
effectively killed well before the end of the legislative session.
40
The bill's defeat, however, led to a resolution setting up a Senate
Interim Committee to develop reform measures to be introduced in the next
session. 4' The Interim Committee, chaired by Senator James L. Mathewson,
was charged with examining not just the malpractice "crisis" but also the
products liability "crisis. ' ' 42 After an initial hearing in Jefferson City, the
Interim Committee was to hold seven hearings around the state during Sep-
tember and October, 1985. 43
29. "An act relating to certain procedures in conjunction with malpractice
litigation against health care providers," S.B. No. 126, 83rd General Assembly, 1st
Sess. (1985), as substituted by the Senate Committee on Insurance, Apr. 11, 1985
[hereinafter cited as S.B. No. 1261.
30. Id. § 3(2).
31. Id. § 3(1).
32. Id. § 2.
33. Id. § 2(3).
34. Id. § 2(5)-upon the death of the claimant.
35. Id. § 2(3).
36. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 14, 1985, at 5A, col. 1.
37. MATA NEWS & LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN, 1985.
38. See MSMA, LEGISLATIVE REPORT (April 25, 1985).
39. See MEDICAL DEFENSE ASSOCIATES, MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION BULLETIN
No. 1, May 3, 1985. MDA is a malpractice insurer. It held 15.93% of the malpractice
insurance market in 1983.
40. See MEDICAL DEFENSE ASSOCIATES, MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION BULLETIN
No. 2 (May 10, 1985).
41. See MSMA, LEGISLATIVE REPORT (May 9, 1985); MSMA, LEGISLATIvE
REPORT (May 15, 1985).
42. 82 MIssoURI MED. 634 (Oct. 1985).
43. Aug. 26, Jefferson City; Sept. 26, Springfield; Sept. 27, Kansas City; Sept.
27, Independence; Sept. 28, Clinton; Oct. 21, Poplar Bluff; Oct. 22, St. Louis (City);
Oct. 22, St. Louis (County). The minutes of the hearings before the Senate Interim
Committee are on file with the Missouri Law Review.
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At that first hearing, the provider position was made clear. Missouri
was facing not just a malpractice insurance crisis" but, far more significantly,
a reinsurance crisis. 45 The providers' "wish list" for substantive tort reform
went further than the contents of the previous year's Senate Bill 126. Both
the Missouri Hospital Association (MHA)" and the Missouri Medical As-
sociation (MSMA)47 suggested a package containing a cap on noneconomic
damages, the elimination of the collateral source rule, structured payments
of large awards, the inclusion of settlements by released defendants in ap-
portioning the relative fault of tortfeasors, the repeal of joint and several
liability, and the introduction of a sliding scale for contingency fee
arrangements.
Of far more importance, however, during this first hearing was the
interest manifested by the Interim Committee that the principals of the in-
volved interest groups should meet and attempt to reach some sort of com-
promise.48 Thenceforth separate negotiations between the principals were to
parallel the work of the Interim Committee.
These negotiations took place between the Missouri Association of Trial
Attorneys (MATA) and a provider coalition. The coalition consisted of
MSMA, MHA, and the Missouri Associatioh of Osteopathic Physicians and
Surgeons (MAOPS). The coalition also involved representatives of Missouri's
"captive" malpractice insurance companies-the so-called "bed-pan mu-
tuals." The coalition and MATA had three formal negotiating sessions.' 9 It
44. SENATE COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PRODUCTS LLB ITY,
INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MALPRACTICE HEARINGS August 26, 1985, at 15 [hereinafter
cited as INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MALPRACTICE] (testimony of Dr. Garth Russell,
MSMA).
45. Id. at 16-18 (testimony of Duane Duaner, President, Missouri Hospital
Association (MHA)), at 28-31 (testimony of Dr. Garth Russell, MSMA).
46. MIssouRi HosPITAL ASSOCIATION, CASE STUDY: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN-
SURANCE, THE CIsIs IN MISSOUI 8-10 (1985).
47. INTERIM COMMITEE ON MALPRACTICE, supra note 44, at 19 (testimony of
Dr. Garth Russell, MSMA). At this time MSMA also proposed an absolute cap on
awards, the establishment of "fair and appropriate standards for expert witnesses"
and the requirement of the filing of an expert's affidavit of opinion within 90 days
of the filing of suit. Id. MSMA had already prepared itself for an intense and
coordinated push for legislation in the second session when the MSMA Council
adopted an action plan on August 24, 1985 (reprinted in ST. Louis METROPOLITAN
MEDICAL SOCIETY, PLAN FOR MALPRACTICE CRISIS 4 (Oct. 1985)).
As evidence of provider seriousness in this regard consider that the Jackson
County Medical Society (Jackson County had been the site of some particularly large
jury awards, see Interim Committee On Malpractice, supra note 44, at 16-17 (testi-
mony of Dr. Garth Russell)) ran television commercials prior to the Interim Com-
mittee's hearings there on Sept. 27. See MATA-IN BRIEF (Nov. 1985).
48. See, e.g., INTERIM CoMMITEE ON MALPRACTICE, supra note 44, at 47-49
(dialogue between Senator Robert Johnson and J. William Turley, President Missouri
Association of Trial Attorneys (MATA)).
49. September 13th & 14th, November 2nd, and November 27th, 1985.
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appears that the coalition goal was to put together a package that would
satisfy their excess insurers and reinsurers.50 In this regard, and of particular
interest to MHA, considerable emphasis would be placed on what was to
crystalize later in the negotiations as a modification of the joint and several
liability rule. The MATA goal apparently was, first, to avoid a far more
dangerous coalition-one between the health care providers and products
manufacturers-by agreeing to a malpractice legislative package, and second,
to exact an agreement on some moratorium on future malpractice legislation.'
Little meaningful agreement was reached during the first two negotiating
sessions. At the third session, however, MATA conceded the joint and several
liability issue in return for a four year moratorium and the splitting of the
malpractice and products liability issues. The rest of the concord was then
finalized. The noneconomic loss cap was agreed to at $350,000 per defendant,
but a single "defendant" would include, for example, both the hospital and
its employees. Further, the cap would be index-linked. The coalition's desire
to include punitive awards within the noneconomic cap and MATA's contrary
desire were compromised by excluding the punitive awards from the cap but
making their award conditional upon a tougher substantive test. MATA's
version of the affidavit of expert provision was adopted as was MATA's
mandatory insurance proposal. The joint proposa5 2 was then communicated
to the Senate Interim Committee, which agreed on a bill apparently giving
effect to the concord on January 8, 1986. 53 On Jainuary 27, and with only
one clarifying amendment5 4 it was granted final approval by both House
and Senate to become the first legislation passed by both houses in the
legislative session.5 The bill was signed by Governor Ashcroft on February
3,56 and, due to the bill's emergency clause, the substantive changes to Mis-
50. The initial Coalition position was that the 1984-85 Missouri malpractice
crisis was real, comprised of a crisis of affordability of liability coverage and avail-
ability of continuing, quality medical care, particularly in the obstetrical, neurosurg-
ical, and orthopedic specialities. The Coalition pointed to the escalating frequency
and severity of claims, "jumbo" awards handed down by runaway juries, and the
large number of frivolous lawsuits filed, but subsequently dropped or lost.
51. The initial MATA position of denying the need for legislative malpractice
reform to deal with "bad" doctors responsible for "bad" medical practice was later
to shift to a focus on the poor investment practices of the malpractice insurance
industry, albeit coupled with a sense that the Coalition was seeking "special interest"
protective legislation in the face of MATA's protection of the interests of the injured
victims of malpractice.
52. The full text of the agreement, aside from the moratorium and products,
liability/malpractice distinction, may be found at 83 MIssoURI MED. 20-21 (1986).
53. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 9, 1986, at 6A, col. 4.
54. S.B. No. 663 § 11, 83rd General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1986) (codified at
Mo. REv. STAT. § 383.110 (11) (1986), [hereinafter cited as S.B. No. 663] was added
in the House to make clear that the legislation only affected causes of action arising
after the bill became law. See Joint Proposal § XI as communicated to the Senate
Interim Committee: "legislation would affect any malpractice incidents occurring on
or after the date of enactment." 83 MissouI MED. 20, 21 (1986).
55. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 28, 1986, at IA, col. 1.
56. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 4, 1986, at 4A, col. 3.
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souri's malpractice law17 became effective immediately (albeit only with re-
gard to causes of action arising on or after that date).58
V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The cornerstone of the eventual agreement between the medical providers
and the trial attorneys was the coupling of the procedural and substantive
tort reforms with provisions designed to increase both the regulation and
financial responsibility of members of the health care industry.5 9 These as-
pects are reflected in the legislation as enacted.
A. Provider Regulation
As provider groups have urged the passage of more and more crisis
legislation, so has one retort from patient advocates become familiar: there
will be less malpractice if incompetent physicians are denied the opportunity
to practice.6 State licensure boards6' seem to have attached a higher priority
to dealing with criminal and drug or alcohol impaired physicians62 than to
disciplining incompetent members of the profession. Indeed, the Inspector
General of the Health and Human Services Department recently concluded
that, of physicians "whose clinical competence is in doubt," "strikingly few"
have been prevented from continuing the practice of medicine.
6 1
57. S.B. No. 663 §§ 4-10.
58. See supra note 54.
59. See letter, dated Dec. 5, 1985, to MATA members from MATA President,
J. William Turley (on file with Missouri Law Review).
60. See, e.g., Bartimus, Kavanaugh & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 37-39. The
then president of the American Medical Association echoed this thought in 1985,
calling for tougher self regulation "to root out the incompetent, the negligent and
the impaired among our colleagues." N.Y. Times, June 18, 1985, at 20, col. 5.
61. Missouri's licensing provisions are to be found at Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 334
(1978 & Supp. 1986).
62. Lack of investigative resources is usually given as the reason for this
prioritization. Thus, investigators for the New York Health Department of late have
only been able to prosecute cases of "urgent public concern." N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,
1983, at 6E, col. 2; see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at A17, col. 1:
An examination of the cases against physicians disciplined last year by the
State Department of Health and the Board of Regents, the licensing agency
that acts on the Health Department's recommendations, showed that the
highest percentage of them involved charges of fraud in Medicaid, the illegal
prescribing or personal use of narcotics, alcoholism, and gross incompetence.
Id. See generally Fisher, Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts and
the Imparied Physician, ST. Louis METROPOLITAN MED. (pts. 1-3) July/Aug., 1985
at 299, Sept., 1985 at 356, Oct., 1985 at 391.
63. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 9, col. 4: "The study concludes that 'the
rate of disciplinary action has been increasing' in recent years 'but still falls far short




At least two major problems have been identified as responsible for the
defects in the current system of state licensure board regulation of physician
incompetence: the great delays associated with license revocation proce-
dureS6 4 and the relative failure of the health care provider industry to report
cases of misconduct or incompetence.
65
Missouri's new malpractice legislation seeks to remedy both of these
problems. It has added a new provision to the licensure act permitting the
State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (Board of Healing Arts) to
request the Administrative Hearing Commission" for an expedited licensure
review in a case where there is constituted "a clear and present danger to
the public health and safety." If the Board of Healing Arts meets its burden,
the commission shall grant it the authority to temporarily suspend the phy-
sician's license.67
State licensure boards generally lack the resources to discover provider
incompetence. 6 1 They must rely upon the lodging of complaints. The new
Missouri legislation seeks to remedy this problem by placing a duty on
hospitals69 to report7" to the appropriate licensing board any disciplinary
action7 l taken (or, which might have been taken, absent her resignation)
against a health care professional.
72
Perhaps mindful of the increasing legal pressure on hospitals to screen,
review, and supervise their medical staffs,73 the statute permits a two-way
flow of information. Members of the hospital reporter class may request
reports of disciplinary action received by the licensing authority from other
64. For example, see the statistics provided by investigations of the New York
State Health Department and the New York State Health Commissioner. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1983, at E6, col. 2.
65. As reported by the Inspector General of the Health and Human Services
Department, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 9, col. 4.
66. See generally Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 621.015-.045 (Supp. 1986). See also
Special Project, Administrative Hearing Commission of Missouri: Fair Treatment for
the Licensed Professional, 37 Mo. L. REv. 410 (1972).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.102 (Supp. 1986). The grounds for licensure action
by the Board of Healing Arts are the same as in the case of nonexpedited procedures.
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 334.100(21) (Supp. 1986) (including "incompetency").
68. This is according to the report of the Inspector-General of the Health and
Human Services Department. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 9, col. 4.
69. As defined in S.B. No. 663 § 1(3).
70. Id. at Sec. 2.
71. As defined, id. at Sec. I(1).
72. Physicians, surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, pharmacists, psychologists, and
licensed nurses. Id. at Sec. 1(2).
73. See, e.g., Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (1982); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d
307 (1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial
Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Darling
v. Charleston Community Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966). See generally Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Res-
pondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence, 47 UMKC L. REv. 171 (1978); South-
wick, Hospital Liability, 4 J. LEG. MED. 17 (1983).
[Vol. 51
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
reporter class members.7 4 Such mandated reports may not be used against a
health care professional in any other judicial proceedings,7 5 thus extending
to such reports the privilege already enjoyed by the internal peer reviews
independently conducted by the reporter class.
7 6
What remains to be seen is whether this new duty to report will have
the desired effect of discovering provider incompetence. In 1983, the New
York State Health Commissioner was sharply critical of what he considered
the general failure of hospitals to report professional misconduct, 7 despite
the existence in that state of a mandatory reporting provision.
7 8
B. Malpractice Insurance
In addition to introducing some minor amendments to Missouri law
detailing the reporting duties of insurers with regard to malpractice claims,
7 9
the new act has introduced compulsory liability insurance ($500,000) for some
providers. 0 The provision only applies to physicians and surgeons who have
staff privileges at a hospital but who do not work there exclusively. The
legislation is, therefore, aimed at providing sufficient compensation (and risk-
spreading) in those cases that, under Missouri law,8' are most difficult to
74. S.B. No. 663 § 2(3).
75. Id. § 2(5). But does the statute clearly prohibit plaintiff from discovering
the report/record? If plaintiff so obtains the substance of the report, quaere what
admissible skeletons may be found in the cupboard?
76. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035(4) (Supp. 1986).
77. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
78. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-e (McKinney 1985).
79. The replacements for Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 383.105, .110 (Supp. 1986)
extend the reporting duties to self-insurers and increase the frequency of such formal
reporting.
80. S.B. No. 663 § 3.
1. Beginning on January 1, 1987, any physician or surgeon who is on the
medical staff or any hospital located in a county which has a population of
more than seventy-five thousand inhabitants shall as a condition to his ad-
mission to or retention on the hospital medical staff, furnish satisfactory
evidence of a medical malpractice insurance policy Of at least five hundred
thousand dollars. The provisions of this section shall not apply to physicians
or surgeons who:
(1) Limit their practice exclusively to patients seen or treated at the
hospital; and
(2) Are insured exclusively under the hospital's policy of insurance or
the hospital's self-insurance program.
2. This section shall not in any way limit or restrict the authority of any
hospital in this state to issue rules or regulations requiring physicians or
other health care professionals to carry minimum levels of professional li-
ability insurance as a condition of membership on a hospital medical staff.
81. See, e.g., Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1985)
(hospital not vicariously liable for negligence of emergency room doctor despite plain-
tiff's assumption that doctor was hospital employee).
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establish under a vicarious liability theory82 against the hospital that granted
the staff privileges.
What is interesting about this new Missouri provision is its silence about
enforcement. Typical mandatory malpractice insurance legislation83 makes
licensure dependent upon insurance." Indeed, this appears to have been the
intent of the coalition-MATA proposal transmitted to the Senate Interim
Committee.85 The Missouri provision as enacted, however, merely makes the
furnishing of "satisfactory evidence of a medical malpractice insurance pol-
icy" a condition of the physician's "admission to or retention on the hospital
medical staff.''86 Thus it is the hospital that is placed in the enforcement
role. However, a hospital already had the power to condition staff privileges
on the carrying of malpractice insurance, 87 a position that the new act im-
pliedly confirms.8 Furthermore, because a hospital may not be vicariously
liable for the physicians to whom this section applies, it will have little
incentive to police the provision.
This incentive would be furnished, however, if this requirement of phy-
sician insurance was read into the hospital's admission/retention duty of care
with regard to the granting of staff privileges.89 Then, a patient who failed
to recover awarded damages from the physician could bring an action against
the hospital for granting privileges to an uninsured or underinsured physician.
If Missouri courts accept this argument, the new act will lead to a magnificent
irony. A provision intended to provide a patient an effective remedy against
a physician in a situation in which a hospital has no vicarious (secondary)
liability will instead have the effect of imposing primary liability upon the
hospital.
82. See generally D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 16.08
(rev. perm. ed. 1984).
83. See generally Muranaka, Compulsory Medical Malpractice Insurance Stat-
utes: An Approach in Determining Constitutionality, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 599 (1978).
See also State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221 (1978) (man-
datory malpractice insurance statute survives due process and equal protection chal-
lenge by physician).
84. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4208 (1977).
85. Joint Proposal § X, 83 MissoURI MED. 20, 21 (Jan. 1986) stated: "A new
law should be adopted adding a requirement to physicians licensure that physicians
on a hospital staff in counties over 75,000 population would carry malpractice in-
surance of at least $500,000." Id. (emphasis added).
86. S.B. No. 663 § 3.1.
87. See Renforth v. Fayette Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 178 Ind. App. 475, 383
N.E.2d 368 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979); Pollock v. Methodist Hosp.,
392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975) (applying Louisana law).
88. S.B. No. 663 § 3.2.
89. See supra materials cited note 73.
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C. Substantive and Procedural Tort Reforms
The new Missouri legislation has introduced five modifications to the
law of medical malpractice: (1) a $350,000 ceiling on noneconomic damages;9'
(2) the conditioning of the award of punitive damages upon a new substantive
test;9' (3) the institution of an optional scheme for the periodic payment of
future damages; 92 (4) the introduction of a post-claim, pretrial requirement
that plaintiff's attorney shall file an affidavit that he has an expert opinion
showing negligence; 9 and (5) a change in the rules governing joint liability
of, and apportionment between, medical codefendants.94
1. Noneconomic Damages Ceiling
In introducing a $350,000 cap on the recovery of noneconomic dam-
ages, 9 Missouri has joined the increasingly large number of jurisdictions
attempting to deal with what the A.M.A. has termed "a primary cause of
the grossly distorted awards in professional liability cases." '96
For the purposes of the new statute, such noneconomic damages97 cons-
sist of approximate claims for pain and suffering, 98 loss of enjoyment of
life,9 and loss of consortium.100 Not only do such damages make up a large
proportion of an award in a typical malpractice case,' 0' but it has been argued
that they provide the plaintiff with a source of funds from which to pay her
attorney's fees.
°0 2
90. S.B. No. 663 § 5.1-.4.
91. Id. § 5.5.
92. Id. § 7.
93. Id. § 8.
94. Id. § 9.
95. In order to discourage jury manipulation of its award so as to circumvent
the ceiling, the existence of the statutory limitation must be kept from the jury. Id.
§ 5.3. It is the judge who will reduce the noneconomic award. Id. § 6.3. An award
for future noneconomic damages may, of course, be subject to the act's provisions
as to a periodic payments structure. Id. § 7.2.
96. ACTION PLAN, supra note 23, at 5.
97. Specifically, such damages are described in the statute as: "damages arising
from nonpecuniary harm including, without limitation, pain, suffering, mental an-
guish, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of capacity to enjoy
life, and loss of consortium but shall not include punitive damages." S.B. No. 663
§ 4(7).
98. See generally D. LoUlISmL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, §§ 18.03-.05.
99. Id. § 18.06.
100. Id. § 18.16.
101. The A.M.A. estimates that noneconomic damages account for 80% of
that portion of an award that exceeds $100,000. Time, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60, col. 1.
102.
[I]t is these damages that make it possible for the injured victim to recover
his losses and also pay his attorney. The pain and suffering damages, in
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Missouri's $350,000 damage ceiling is not as severe as some that have
been introduced. 0 3 Moreover, it is index-linked, ' " and the limitation applies
only to each "defendant."' '0 However, in the act, "defendant" is given a
unique definition.- For example, for purposes of the per defendant limi-
tation, a plaintiff who successfully sued a hospital and, say, ten of its em-
other words, are simply a means of financing the contingent-fee litigation,
since without them the fee would come out of medical expenses of the client
and even a successful lawsuit would then fail to compensate him.
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 8.1, at 550-51 (1973).
Contrast this view with a dissenting voice in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665, 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 392, app. dism'dfor want offederal question,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985). "For a child who has been paralyzed from the neck down,
the only compensation for a lifetime without play comes from noneconomic damages.
Similarly, a person who has been hideously disfigured receives only noneconomic
damages to ameliorate the resulting humiliation and embarrassment." Id. (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
103. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986) ($250,000); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:711 (1983) ($250,000). Some jurisdictions approximate this
position by placing a cap on "general" but not "special" damages. See, e.g., Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984) ($200,000 in cases not involving death);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1985) ($500,000); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590i § 11.02(a) (Supp. 1986) ($500,000). Some jurisdictions have not
discriminated between types of damages and have enacted overall caps. See, e.g., VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1984) ($1,000,000).
However, any such limitation on recovery may have serious repercussions. See
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 392, app.
dism'd for want of federal question, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985):
At first blush, $250,000 sounds like a considerable sum to allow for none-
conomic damages. However, ... most large recoveries come in cases in-
volving permanent damage to infants or to young, previously healthy adults.
Spread out over the expected lifetime of a young person, $250,000 shrinks
to insignificance. Injured infants are prohibited from recovering more than
three or four thousand dollars per year, no matter how excruciating their
pain, how truncated their lifespans, or how grotesque their disfigurement.
Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
104. S.B. No. 663 § 5.4.
105. Id. § 5.1.
106. "Defendant" for purposes of sections 4 to 10 of this act shall be defined
as:
(1) A hospital as defined in chapter 197, RSMo, and its employees and
physician employees who are insured under the hospital's professional lia-
bility insurance policy or the hospital's self-insurance maintained for profes-
sional liability purposes;
(2) A physician, including his nonphysician employees who are insured
under the physician's professional liability insurance or under the physician's
self-insurance maintained for professional liability purposes;
(3) Any other health care provider having the legal capacity to sue and be
sued and who is not included in subdivisions (I) and (2) of this subsection,
including employees of any health care providers who are insured under the
health care provider's professional liability insurance policy or self-insurance
maintained for professional liability purposes.
Id. § 5.2.
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ployees would be limited to a $350,000 recovery, whereas if she successfully
sued a hospital and an independent physician she could recover up to $700,000.
The act does not address the problems that may be caused by involve-
ment in the litigation of a nonhealth care provider. For instance, suppose a
hospital and a drug manufacturer are found liable on malpractice and prod-
ucts liability theories. The jury returns a verdict of $10,000,000 in favor of
the plaintiff, apportioning the relative fault of the defendants at 50% each.
The jury itemizes the noneconomic damages component of its award at
$5,000,000.107 Consider the following possible interpretations of the new act
and their results.
(1) The judge considers that the $5,000,000 noneconomic damages part
of the award was the result of an "action against a health care provider". lS
The judge reduces it to $350,000.0 9 Thus, the hospital and manufacturer are
jointly liable for the reduced award of $5,350,000.
(2) The judge considers that only 50% of the noneconomic award
($2,500,000) was against the hospital ("action against a health care provi-
der") and so reduces only that portion of the award to $350,000.Io0 Thus
the total noneconomic award would be for $2,850,000, with $2,500,000 to
be paid by the manufacturer, and $350,000 to be paid by the hospital.
(3) The judge reduces the noneconomic damages award to $2,850,000,
as in the second example, and enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Because the damage cap provision does not effect the general rules as to
joint and several liability,"' the plaintiff seeks recovery of the full amount
from the hospital. At best, the hospital will only be able to recoup the
manufacturer's equitable share-50% of $2,850,000 ($1,425,000).
(4) The judge interprets the new act's noneconomic ceiling as applying
only to actions in which all the defendants are "health care providers." When
a nonhealth care provider is found to be a judgment defendant, the ceiling
ceases to apply to any and all defendants. Thus, the plaintiff will recover
the full $5,000,000 noneconomic award on traditional joint and several lia-
bility principles.
All four interpretations find support in the wording of the act. The
second example given ($2,500,000 to be paid by the manufacturers; $350,000
by the hospital) seems to bear the closest resemblance to the intent of the
MATA and coalition negotiators.
107. Pursuant to S.B. No. 663 § 61.
108. Id. § 5.1.
109. Pursuant to S.B. No. 663 § 6.3.
110. The manufacturer is not a "defendant" for the purposes of § 5 and cannot
claim the cap's benefit.
111. Even if the joint and several liability abrogation was applicable to a hos-
pital-manufacturer situation, see infra text accompanying notes 156-65, that provi-
sion (§ 9.2) would not apply here because of the 50% liability shares.
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2. Punitive Damage Claims
According to the American Medical Association,
The damages awarded in a professional liability lawsuit are intended to
provide compensation for injury. By definition, punitive damages are in
addition to full compensation for a plaintiff's injuries. Punitive damages
are particularly inappropriate in medical professional liability suits because
state licensing boards, medical society and hospital peer review systems, and
the criminal justice system provide adequate mechanisms to discipline
physicians."'
Prior to the new legislation, the appropriate standard under Missouri law,
for cases involving a punitive damage claim made in connection with a mal-
practice (negligence) submission, revolved around a showing of "complete
indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.""13
Henceforth, Missouri law will require that plaintiffs meet the more strin-
gent test that "an award of punitive damages against a health care provider
... shall be made only upon a showing by a plaintiff that the health care
provider demonstrated willful, wanton or malicious misconduct with respect
to his actions." '" 4
Although punitive damages are essentially "noneconomic," any such
awards are excluded from the $350,000 damage ceiling."' Additionally, pu-
nitive damages are "past damages" and so should not be subject to the new
statute's provisions with regard to the periodic payment of future damages."
6
3. Structured Payment of Future Damages
The structuring of settlements to provide for the periodic payment of
damages to a plaintiff is widely utilized today. Such an approach can hold
major benefits for both the plaintiff and the defendant's liability insurer."1
7
In practice, the parties will negotiate as to annuity packages which, when
discounted for present value, ' 8 correspond to the nondisclosed lump sum
settlement amounts the parties are promoting in the negotiations.
A periodic payment scheme for future damages introduced by statute is
a very different animal. In the first place, such schemes apply to judgment
112. ACTION PLAN, supra note 30, at 5-6. For a general treatment of punitive
awards in malpractice cases, see D. LOUSELL & H. WLMS, supra note 82, § 18.18.
113. M.A.I. 10.02 (3d ed. 1978, 1983 Rev.). See generally Smith v. Courter,
575 S.W.2d 199, 206-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
114. S.B. No. 663 § 5.5. A similar, albeit more elaborate, provision is to be
found at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (Supp. 1984); cf. 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A.
84-7, § 2-1115 (West) (abrogating punitive awards in malpractice cases).
115. S.B. No. 663 § 4(7).
116. Id. § 7.
117. See Frasca & Brady, Structuring Settlements: Who Wins?, 1982 TRIAL 41
(August).
118. See R. POSNER, ECONOIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.13 (2d Ed. 1977).
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awards and not to settlements. In the second place, it is only "future"
damages which are subjected to a typical periodic payments scheme." 9
However, the most important distinction between a periodic payments
scheme and a structured settlement is that the latter involves a fixed amount,
albeit one that may fluctuate as to the dollar amounts involved in one or
more of the future installments. The most widely touted advantage for a
periodic payments scheme is that it opens up the possibility of adjusting the
award to take account of postjudgment events. As has been stated:
[P]eriodic payments would enable account to be taken of some of the actual,
rather than forecast, changes after the trial. If a partially incapacitated
plaintiff suffered a deterioration in his medical condition so that he became
completely unable to work, it would be possible, if suitable review procedures
could be established, to adjust his compensation accordingly. Similarly, if
his condition improved so that he could take a better paid job than was
first thought, his compensation might be reduced. In this respect, periodic
payments would produce fairer results both for the plaintiff and for the
defendant. Certain changes in economic conditions after the trial might also
be taken into account. For example, provided that the necessary financial
arrangements could be devised, the payments might be inflation proofed. 20
Nevertheless, the periodic payment schemes that actually have been imple-
mented have not involved any such sophisticated adjustment provisions.
Rather, a simpler intent has evinced itself:
[To eliminate the potential windfall from a lump-sum recovery which was
intended to provide for the care of an injured plaintiff over an extended
period who then dies shortly after the judgment is paid, leaving the balance
of the judgment award to persons and purposes for which it was not
intended.2
In fact, the new Missouri periodic payments regime is similar to that provided
for in the 1985 Senate Committee Substitute for S.B. No. 126.' 22 Under the
1986 Act, the trier of fact will itemize the damages awarded so as to distin-
guish, first, between past and future damages; second, between economic and
119. Compare ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1977), which suggests that past damages
could, at the court's discretion, be paid out periodically. Note also that the Alabama
statute does not contain any provision for the addition of interest on the unpaid sum.
Cf. S.B. No. 663 § 7.2.
120. ROYAL CoMMISSIoN ON Civi LIABILTrY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY § 568 Cmnd. 7054-I (1978).
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(0 (West 1980). See generally UNIF. PERI-
ODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 22 (Supp. 1985).
122. The main differences are as follows: (1) S.B. No. 126's periodic payments
scheme was triggered if future damages exceeded $50,000. The 1986 Act has a $100,000
total damages threshold. (2) S.B. No. 126 would have permitted the plaintiff to request
an increase in his medical expenses award. The 1986 Act contains no such provision.
(3) Under S.B. No. 126, the death of the plaintiff would have led to the cessation
of payments as to future medical expenses and future pain and suffering damages.
The 1986 Act curtails only the payment of future medical expenses.
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noneconomic damages; and third, between future medical expenses and other
future economic damages. 23 If the total amount of the award in the case
exceeds $100,000, then either the plaintiff2 4 or defendant,2s may request a
structured, periodic payments scheme for the future damages awarded.
This request must be made "prior to the entry of judgment." 2 6 A request
made after the entry of a lump sum judgment would not be timely. 27 Once
the request for periodic payments has been made, an order to that effect
must be included in the judgment. The judge is not given discretion in the
matter.' However, the judge is given discretion to order the posting of
security for future payments by the defendant,' 29 and, although not supplied
with any criteria, is responsible for setting the payment structure and (any)
interest amount in the absence of agreement between the parties as to these
matters.,3 0
Upon the death of the plaintiff, the only payments that will cease are
future medical expenses.' Payments reflecting, for example, future pain and
suffering or lost earning capacity would continue to be paid by the defendant.
It remains to be seen whether this small reduction in the amount of the
"windfall" to the plaintiff's estate is worth the additional administrative
costs associated with instituting a periodic payments scheme.
One further problem remains to be considered. Assume that the total
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is $150,000. The trier of fact itemizes this
as $50,000 in past damages and $100,000 in future damages; the defendant
requests a periodic payments plan. The new act creates a presumption that
the attorney's contingency fee will be paid when the judgment becomes fi-
nal.' If the contingency was, for instance, 40% ($60,000), the plaintiff will
leave the courtroom in debt to her attorney and without the funds to pay
her previously incurred costs. Not only does this give rise to serious ethical
concerns, but failure to advise a client of the potential for such a result might
expose plaintiff's attorney to a legal malpractice action analogous to an
informed consent case. 33
123. S.B. No. 663 § 6, by reference to the definitions found in § 4. For what
constitutes such medical expenses, see D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMs, supra note 82, §
18.15.
124. The plaintiff's interest would be in beneficial tax consequences. See Frasca
& Brady, supra note 117, at 42-43; see also UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS
ACT, 14 U.L.A. 22, 23 (Supp. 1985).
125. Note that "defendant" is given a special definition by S.B. No. 663 § 5.2.
126. Id. § 7.2.
127. Craven v. Crout, 163 Cal. App. 3d 779, 784, 209 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652
(1985).
128. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 677-78, 368 Cal. Rptr.
368, 380-81, app. dism'd for want of federal question, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
129. S.B. No. 663 § 7.3.
130. Id. § 7.2.
131. Id. § 7.5. "Medical damages" as defined at § 4(6).
132. Id. § 7.4.
133. See generally Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1979).
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In fact, the solution to this problem may lie in the hands of the trial
judge. The act provides that "[alt the request of any party ... the court
shall include in the judgment a requirement that future damages be paid in
whole or in part in periodic or installment payments . . . . -4 As already
noted,'35 the trial judge when so requested, is not given discretion with regard
to the basic issue as to whether to structure the judgment. Nevertheless, the
provision could be interpreted to give the judge discretion as to whether the
"whole" or only a "part" of the future damages award should be structured.
Thus, in our example, the judge could deduct an amount (say $30,000) from
the $100,000 future damages award which when combined with the past
damages ($50,000) will produce a sum sufficient to pay the attorney's fees
and immediate medical expenses ($80,000). The judge will then structure the
payment of the remaining $70,000. In any event, it is to be hoped that
attorneys will modify their contingency fee agreements to provide for in-
stallment payment of the attorneys' fees in the event of a periodic payments
structure being ordered at judgment. Such a method of dealing with the
contingency fee is already utilized by some attorneys who negotiate structured
settlements for their clients.
4. Affidavit of Negligence
Henceforth, and no later than ninety days after she has filed her clients'
petition, the plaintiff's attorney will be required to file an affidavit to the
effect that she has obtained a written opinion from a health care provider
that the defendant fell below the requisite standard of care, said breach
having caused the damages complained of. 36
Several difficulties arise regarding this provision. First, its utility is far
from clear. This is not a settlement-encouraging provision like the "notice
of intention to file suit" legislation found in other jurisdictions. 37 Neither
134. S.B. No. 663 § 7.2 (emphasis added).
135. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,
app. dism'd for want of federal question 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
136. S.B. No. 663, § 8.1, provides:
In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury
or death on account of the rendering of or failure to render health care
services, the plaintiff or his attorney shall file an affidavit with the court
stating that he has obtained the written opinion of a legally qualified health
care provider which states that the defendant health care provider failed to
use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful health care provider would
have under similar circumstances and that such failure to use such reasonable
care directly caused or directly contributed to cause the damages claimed in
the petition.
Id. The 90-day timing provision is found at § 8.4.
137. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-CS (1983); VA. CODE § 8.01581.1
(1984); see also Dougherty v. Olivero, 427 A.2d 487, 489 (Me. 1981): "The purpose
of [Maine's] notice-of-claim requirement is to provide a mandatory 90-day waiting
period during which medical malpractice claims can be settled without litigation through
the use of the dispute resolution procedures established [under statute]."
1986]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
does it give the defense advance notice of plaintiff's theories of liability or
causation, because there is no requirement that the opinion of plaintiff's
reviewer be attached to the affidavit.13 1 It does not move forward the time
at which plaintiff must endorse her expert, 39 because there is no requirement
that plaintiff's reviewer shall also be plaintiff's expert at trial. Indeed, all
that is expected of the reviewer is that she be "legally qualified," which, in
Missouri, does not necessarily mandate current licensure." 40
At best, this affidavit provision will hinder somewhat plaintiff's attorney
who has a totally unmeritorious case and who may have filed suit and gam-
bled on conducting a successful "fishing expedition" during the discovery
process.
At worst, and herein lies the second major problem with the affidavit
provision, this totally procedural device may, unwittingly, run counter to
some aspects of Missouri's substantive malpractice law. As drafted, the new
act calls for the affidavit from plaintiff or her attorney "in any action against
a health care provider.., on account of the rendering of... health care."
In such a case, the affidavit from the reviewing professional must state that
the defendant "failed to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful
health care provider would have under similar circumstances.' ' 4' Not only
does this constitute an unwarranted deviation from the wording of Missouri's
approved jury instruction in malpractice cases, 42 but apparently ignores those
situations, such as foreign objects 43 or battery'4 cases, where the substantive
standard of care is not custom based. 145
138. Cf. 1985 I11. Legis. Serv. P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(a)(i) (West). But see Jagoe
v. Blocksom, 440 A.2d 1022 (Me. 1982), discussing Maine's analogous pre-claim
affidavit provision, ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2903 (Supp. 1985), which is also
designed to weed out unmeritorious claims. "We reject the defendants' attempts to
convert a notice of claim into a pre-action discovery device." Jagoe, 440 A.2d at
1025.
139. For the endorsement of expert witnesses, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i);
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(b)(4)(a), see also Manahan v. Watson, 655 S.W.2d 807 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (defendant's expert should not have been permitted to testify because
of defendant's failure to answer interrogatories as to name and expected testimony
subject matter of his expert).
In practice the defense will file a motion for a protective order requesting the
court to require that plaintiff endorse his expert or experts at least, for example,
ninety days prior to trial.
140. See Eichelberger v. Barnes Hosp., 655 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
cf. 1985 I1. Legis. Serv. P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(a)(1).
141. S.B. No. 663 § 8.1.
142. M.A.I. 11.06 (3d ed. 1978); see Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo.
1972).
143. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Christensen, I F.2d 215, 217 (8th Cir. 1924) (no
requirement of expert testimony in case involving surgical sponge left in abdominal
cavity).
144. For the distinction between "no-consent" (battery) and "no-informed con-
sent" (negligence, often utilizing the "custom" standard) cases, see Mink v. University
of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
145. See, e.g., Swan v. Tygett, 669 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(plaintiff could make use of res ipsa loquitur doctrine when she had received an injury
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Furthermore, under the affidavit provision the plaintiff's reviewer must
also give her (expert) opinion as to causation. Yet Missouri law also recog-
nizes causation issues in malpractice cases where expert testimony is not
required. 46 The purpose of the affidavit provision is to discourage or hinder
the making of unmeritorious claims. It would be a strange result if plaintiff's
attorney in the most meritorious of cases-one for which expert testimony
is not required by the courts-nevertheless must suffer the trouble and ex-
pense of acquiring expert review after filing the complaint.
The third flaw in the affidavit provision is in regard to its sanctions. If
the plaintiff's attorney does not file the required affidavit, the defendant
may move for dismissal, albeit without prejudice. 47 The affidavit provision
as drafted, however, fails to consider the situation where an affidavit of
obtained opinion has been filed but is, in some (non-technical) 48 way defec-
tive. Consider the following hypotheticals. First, plaintiff's (scrupulous) at-
torney files an affidavit of opinion but the reviewer was negligent in performing
the review. Second, plaintiff's (unscrupulous) attorney files an affidavit with-
out having obtained a reviewing expert's opinion. Third, plaintiff's (unscru-
pulous) attorney and her reviewer conspire over the issue of review and an
affidavit is filed in a situation where no reasonable reviewer would have
given an opinion of negligence or causation.
Assume that the defectiveness of plaintiff's attorney's affidavit is ex-
posed. What sanctions will follow? Unlike the Missouri provision, the Illinois
statute is specific, providing that the defense may recover reasonable expenses
incurred and attorneys' fees caused by the defect. 49 Furthermore, in the case
of our first hypothetical (negligent reviewer), the Illinois statute grants a
reviewer who had acted in good faith civil immunity from (presumably) a
negligence action brought by plaintiff's attorney to offset her own statutory
unrelated to the operative procedure); Goodenough v. Deaconess Hosp., 637 S.W.2d
123, 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (no expert testimony required when nurse assistant
failed to adjust kneeling board prior to making examination using proctoscopic table).
Of course, the argument could be made that "the rendering of or failure to
render health care services" (S.B. No. 663 § 8.1) does not include such cases. How-
ever, because the same introductory wording is used elsewhere in the act, this would
remove these cases from, for example, the noneconomic damages and structured
payments provisions.
Note also that Illinois has a specific rule for res ipsa loquitur cases in its affidavit
statute. See 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(c) (West).
146. See, e.g., Robbins v. Jewish Hosp., 663 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) ("sudden onset" rule applied); Pinky v. Winer, 674 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (plaintiff's own nonexpert testimony sufficed).
147. S.B. No. 663 § 8.5. The Illinois provision is similar: 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(g). Quaere: the effect on the period of limitations in the case of
such a dismissal? Presumably the answer is to be found in Missouri's "savings"
statute. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.230 (1978).
148. For a "technical violation" issue (in casu, concerning whether "under
oath"), see Paradis v. Webber Hosp., 409 A.2d 672 (Me. 1979); cf. Jagoe v. Block-
som, 440 A.2d 1022 (Me. 1982).
149. 1985 IL. Legis. Serv. P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(e) (West).
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liability to the defendant. 50 Absent such statutory immunity under the Mis-
souri statute, plaintiff's attorney would still be able to bring such an action.'
In our last two hypotheticals, the defendant would be the one to bring
an action against the plaintiff's attorney (second hypothetical) or against the
attorney and his reviewer (third hypothetical). In either case, the defendant
would have to establish the existence of a private right to damages for per-
jury, an issue not yet decided by Missouri courts."1
2
Of course, a threshold question must be addressed. How would the
defendant's attorney (or, in the case of the first hypothetical, the plaintiff's
attorney) ever discover what happened? Under the affidavit provision, plain-
tiff's attorney is under no obligation to name his reviewer. Further, the
defendant's opportunity to depose the reviewer would not arise unless the
plaintiff named the reviewer as her expert.' A very different situation ob-
tains under the Illinois statute where, following judgment or dismissal of
plaintiff's claim, the defense may depose plaintiff's reviewing health
professional. '14
150. Id. § 2-622(0, providing that "a reviewing health professional who in good
faith prepares a report used in conjunction with an affidavit required by this Section
shall have civil immunity from liability which otherwise might result from the prep-
aration of such report."
151. See, e.g., Danyo v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 318 Pa. Super. 28, 464 A.2d 501
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (professional liability carrier had duty to defend physician-
expert in action brought by attorney for negligence in preparation of medical report).
152. Tufts v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Mo. 1981); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFEssiONAL REsPONsmILrrY DR 1-102 (1980).
153. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 56.01(a)(4)(b). Consider the situation where plaintiff's
attorney does endorse the reviewer as his expert for the trial. Two defense tactics
suggest themselves. Both will be greeted by plaintiff objections as to relevance. First,
the defense will be interested in the expert's regular employment as a plaintiffs' reviewer
as well as his regular employment as a plaintiffs' expert, because this tends to establish
the bias or interest of the expert. See R. HASL & J. O'BRIEN, MissouRI LAw OF
EviDENCE § 5-6 (1984). Second, suppose that through questioning the defense obtains
an admission from the expert that the pre-affidavit review was made and opinion
given without, say, an examination of the plaintiffs file (or without a physical ex-
amination of the plaintiff). The defense could then question the weight that should
be given to the expert's testimony at trial, on the basis that the plaintiff's expert was
predisposed to an opinion that the defendant's medical care had been substandard.
The future will speak as to the advisability of plaintiffs' attorneys' use of the same
physician as both reviewer and expert in the same case. Quaere: could plaintiff's
attorney argue work product?
154. The full Illinois provision is as follows:
Allegations and denials in the affidavit, made without reasonable cause and
found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them or his attorney,
or both, to the payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the
other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with reasonable at-
torneys' fees to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within
30 days of the judgment or dismissal. In no event shall the award for
attorneys fees and expenses exceed those actually paid by the moving party,
including the insurer, if any. In proceedings under this paragraph (e), the
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5. Joint Liability and Relative Fault
Today, the starting point for any discussion of Missouri law relating to
joint tortfeasors and contribution rules of course must be the Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co.'" At that
time the court introduced a relative fault approach to non-contractual in-
demnity and contribution between non-contractual judgment and nonjudg-
ment tortfeasors. Missouri's new statutory rule for malpractice cases runs
counter to one of the basic principles underlying Whitehead & Kales while
at the same time supplying a solution to one of the questions that that case
left unanswered.
(i) Joint and Several Liability
With regard to the former, the court in Whitehead & Kales when sum-
ming up its holding stated: "Plaintiff continues free to sue one or more
concurrent tortfeasors as he sees fit and nothing that transpires between them
as to their relative responsibility can reduce or take away from plaintiff any
part of his judgment."'5 6
Under the new act, the jury will continue to assess the relative fault of
the codefendants and express their equitable shares in percentage terms.'57
However, the legislation has departed from the traditional rules of joint and
several liability in providing that: "any defendant against whom an award
of damages is made shall be jointly liable only with those defendants whose
apportioned percentage of fault is equal to or less than such defendant."' 5 8
In so providing, while several liability is preserved, joint liability is subjected
to a pyramiding rule. 59
Take the situation where a plaintiff successfully establishes the liability
of a hospital, a surgeon, and a referring physician. The jury apportions the
relative fault of the defendants as follows: hospital-30%, surgeon-30%,
and referring physician-40%. Under the new act, the referring physician
will be jointly liable for 100% of the damages. The hospital and the surgeon
will not be jointly liable for the referring physician's 40%70 but will be jointly
moving party shall have the right to depose and examine any and all re-
viewing health professionals who prepared reports used in conjunction with
an affidavit required by this Section.
1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 84-7, § 2-622(e) (West).
155. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
156. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474.
157. S.B. No. 663 § 9.1.
158. Id. § 9.2.
159. For a discussion of more radical proposals with regard to the joint and
several liability rule, see Comment, Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability: Should
Missouri be Next in Line?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 72 (1983). See also Comment, Where
is the Principle of Fairness in Joint and Several Liability-Missouri Stops Short of
a Comprehensive Comparative Fault System, 50 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1985).
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liable for each other's 30% shares. Because of the statute's special definition
of "defendant," 160 however, this would not be the case if the surgeon either
was a hospital employee or was insured under the hospital's malpractice
policy. In this modified situation, the hospital and surgeon would be con-
sidered a single "defendant" with an apportioned share of 60% relative fault.
Therefore the hospital/surgeon would be jointly liable for the referring phy-
sician's 40% but the referring physician would escape joint liability for the
hospital/surgeon share.
There is an additional quirk flowing from this statutory definition of
"defendant." It is arguable that the modification to the joint liability rule
would be inapplicable in a situation in which the other liable defendant was
not a "health care provider."'' For example, assume that a hospital was
held to be 10% responsible, a nonemployee physician 200/%, and an under-
insured drug manufacturer 70% liable. The hospital would not be jointly
liable for the physician's 20% (not "equal to or less than" 10%) but would
be jointly liable for the manufacturers' 70% (not a "defendant").
Somewhat strange (from the health care provider's perspective) results
flow, therefore, from the use of this extended definition of "defendant."
Given the absence of any such suggestion in the MATA-coalition proposals' 62
and the placement of this definition in the noneconomic damages cap section 63
rather than in the general definition section,' 64 it is suggested that some doubt
exists as to whether this extended definition was meant to have applied to
the entire statute rather than just to the noneconomic damages section. 65
(ii) Relative Fault of Settling Defendants
The second provision of the new act, dealing with contribution and
relative fault, concerns settling tortfeasors, an issue not addressed in White-
head & Kales. ' Once again, consider the example of a plaintiff filing suit
against a hospital, a nonemployee surgeon, and a referring physician. Let us
suppose that, if the case had been so tried, the jury would have apportioned
liability at hospital-50%, surgeon-30%, and physician-20%, and assessed
160. S.B. No. 663 § 5.2(1).
161. As defined in § 5.2, which itself makes use of the "health care provider"
definition in § 4(5).
162. In the concord, (see 83 MIssouRI MED. 20-21 (Jan. 1986)), the joint and
several liability provision merely refers to "defendant" and "defendants." Id. § VI(a).
Only the noneconomic damages provision incorporates the extended definition of
"defendant." Id. § I(b).
163. S.B. No. 663 § 5.2.
164. Id. § 4.
165. It is suggested that § 5.2 should have commenced with the phrase,
'Defendant' for the purposes of this section," rather than the draftsman's "sections
4 to 10 of this act shall be defined as: .... "
166. For a most helpful examination of some of the problems arising, see
Comment, Problems for Joint Tortfeasors Under Whitehead & Kales: The Need for
a Duty of Good Faith, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 929 (1983).
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a total liability of $1,000,000. However, before trial the surgeon settles the
plaintiff's claim against her for $100,000. Under Missouri's contribution
statute,'67 that $100,000 settlement would be deducted from a subsequent
$1,000,000 verdict against the hospital and physician alone. If the surgeon's
relative fault had been assessed by the jury she would have been liable for
$300,000. In other words, the remaining tortfeasors would have been liable
?or the additional $200,000 split between the two of them according to their
percentages of relative fault, as assessed by the jury. Furthermore, the hos-
pital and physician would not have been able to bring a contribution action
for that sum (the "extra" $200,000) against the settling surgeon.' 6
One suggested solution for this problem was that rather than reduce the
award by the amount of the settlement, it should be reduced by that per-
centage of relative fault attributed to the settling tortfeasor. 69 Thus, in our
example, the hospital would be liable for $500,000 and the physician $200,000.
The $300,000 of liability allocated to the surgeon would be satisfied by the
$100,000 settlement.
This solution has been adopted by Missouri's new malpractice act, which
provides that "the claim of the releasing person against other persons or
entities is reduced by the amount of the released persons' or entities' equitable
share of the total obligation imposed by the court pursuant to a full appor-
tionment of fault under this section as though there had been no release."'
70
Under this new provision, the apportionment of relative fault is for the
jury.'71 Yet, our hypothetical settling surgeon, having been dismissed from
the case, will not be able to fight her own battle in the courtroom. Indeed,
the nonsettling defendants will have an incentive to "sandbag" the surgeon,
thus placing the plaintiff in the position of proving not only the nonsettling
defendants' negligence but the settling defendant's non-negligence as well.
72
167. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1986).
168. Id. For the converse situation, where the settling tortfeasor brings an action
against nonsettling, nonjudgment joint tortfeasors, see Stephenson v. McClure, 606
S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Mid-Continent News Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 671
S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
169. See Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 202-05 (Mo. 1980)
(en bane) (Welliver, J., dissenting); see also State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete
Contractors Inc. v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (Donnelly,
J., dissenting).
The issue was again raised in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 n.10 (Mo.
1983) (en banc). Cognizant of section 537.060's effect of reducing the total award
by the amount of the settlement, the supreme court urged the legislature (somewhat
ironically given the Gustafson majority's views as to legislative inactivity) to replace
section 537.060 with a relative fault rule based on the UNroud COmPARATivE FAULT
ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 45-46 (Supp. 1986). According to the comment therein: "Al-
though it may have some tendency to discourage a claimant from entering into a
settlement, this solution is fairly based on the proportionate-fault principle." Id. at
46, Commissioners Comment to § 6.
170. S.B. No. 663 § 9.3.
171. Id. § 4(2).
172. See, e.g., Paul v. N.L. Indus., 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1981).
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Following the jury's apportionment of relative fault and determination
of the total award, it will be for the trial judge to reduce the award by the
amount of the released defendant's settlement prior to entering judgment.,
VI. THE CONCORD, THE ACT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REviEw
Whatever the practical effects and interpretative problems that may fol-
low from the new act, it is its constitutionality that will raise the greatest
furor. Some threshold issues must first, however, be addressed. The concord
is to last for four years, and yet the new act's substantive and procedural
tort reforms apply only to causes of action arising after its enactment. Given
the painfully slow progress of a malpractice suit towards trial, can the su-
preme court be expected to have decided on the act's constitutionality within
the life of the concord? 174 Furthermore, and raising some delicate ethical
issues, would a member of the plaintiff's bar want to challenge the act?'17
If a provision in the act were successfully challenged would that effectively
bring the concord to an end, 76 or would the members of MATA and the
coalition consider themselves to be under an obligation to redraft the inval-
idated section(s)?
Such speculation aside, which of the new act's provisions are likely to
be challenged? It is suggested that the affidavit and punitive damages pro-
visions will be treated by the plaintiffs' bar merely as the irritants they are,
and will not prompt constitutional review. Furthermore, in practice, and
particularly given that the new act has also introduced mandatory malpractice
insurance for a large number of physicians and surgeons, the modification
to the joint and several liability rule will not cause sufficient problems to
make review worthwhile. Therefore, any initial constitutional battles will be
with regard to the periodic payments and noneconomic cap provisions. The
most likely challenges to these provisions will be on the bases that they are
violative of the plaintiff's state and federal equal protection guarantees and
the guarantee of "certain remedy" provided by the Missouri Constitution.
77
173. See M.A.I. § 1.06, Committee's Comment (1983 New) (West Supp. 1983).
174. Of course, any such ruling would affect the existing accrued claims.
175. Consider in this regard, MODEL CODE OF PRoFssIONAL REsPONSIBILITY
EC 5-21 ("Desires of Third Persons"), DR 7-101 ("Representing a Client Zealously")
(1980).
Tom Hullverson, a partner of the St. Louis firm Hullverson, Hullverson & Frank,
Inc., and a member of the MATA negotiating team (see letter from MATA president
to MATA members dated Dec. 5, 1985), is reported to have contehded that the new
law may be violative of constitutional guarantees of equal protection, and to have
stated that: "Health care providers have a very special interest in the law ... and
the new law accords them special treatment." St. Louis Bus. J., Feb. 10-16, 1986,
at 12, col. 3.
176. The majority of the provisions of the concord and the act would, of course,
continue in force because of the act's severability clause. S.B. No. 663 § 10.
177. Challenges on the basis of deprivation of substantial due process (Mo.
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A. Equal Protection
The most commonly utilized attack on malpractice crisis legislation-
particularly limitations on quantum-over the past decade has been that it
CONST. art. 1, § 10), interference with the right to trial by jury (Id. § 22(a)), and the
rule against one statute dealing with multiple subjects (Id. art. 3, § 23), are also
considered to be likely.
A due process challenge would be premised on the diminution of the value of
plaintiffs' malpractice actions without the legislative provision of an adequate quid
pro quo. See Note, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Con-
stitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv. J.
ON LEGis. 143 (1981). Absent Missouri's adoption of the quid pro quo approach, it
is suggested that the due process review will track the equal protection/rational basis
analysis detailed infra text accompanying notes 180-98. En passant it should be
noted that the United States Supreme Court soon may be prepared to consider a quid
pro quo argument.
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985), the Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of California on the basis that it
disclosed no substantial federal question. In his lone dissent, Justice White stated:
Whether Due Process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme
to be a quid pro quo for the common law or state law remedy it replaces,
and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved
by this Court, and one which is dividing the appellate and highest courts of
several states. The issue is important, and is deserving of this Court's review.
Moreover, given the continued national concern over the 'malpractice crisis,'
it is likely that more states will enact similar types of limitations, and that
the issue will recur. I find, therefore, that the federal question presented by
this appeal is substantial, and dissent from the Court's conclusion to the
contrary.
Id. at 216.
When Justice White dissented from the same result in Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, 106 S. Ct. 421 (1985) (White, Brennan, J.J., dissenting), he was joined
(without opinion) by Justice Brennan. As the number of examples of restrictive
malpractice legislation grows, the Supreme Court may be moving towards a deter-
mination, once and for all, of their validity.
A "right to trial by jury" violation would be premised on the role given the
judge in both the structured payments provision (i.e., setting the timing of installments
and the interest rate), and the noneconomic damages cap (i.e., reducing the award
to $350,000). See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal.
3d 359, 375-76, 683 P.2d 670, 680-81, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 681-82 (1984). Compare
id. at 689-94 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Note, however, that one of the problems faced
by the Supreme Court of California is not present in the Missouri Statute. Senate Bill
No. 663 § 6.1 clearly places the itemization of awards in the hands of the jury.
The "multiple subjects" challenge (see, e.g., Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v.
King, 664 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)), would be premised on the "marriage"
of provisions designed to reduce/stabilize insurance rates with a provision designed
to expedite physician action. This challenge will fail if the court adopts a broad
characterization of the new statutory provisions as, for example, designed to alleviate
the malpractice crisis.
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violates the equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions. 7 8 Most
jurisdictions have rejected this argument. 7 9
To make a case before Missouri courts about the violation of equal
protection guarantees, 80 a challenger (the plaintiff-patient in the underlying
malpractice action) must show, first, that the statutory provision is factually
178. See generally Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional
Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 195, 202-19, 220-21 (1985);
Comment, Alternatives to the Medical Malpractice Phenomenon: Damage Limita-
tions, Malpractice Review Panels and Countersuits, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1179,
1182-86 (1977); Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An
Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829 (1979); Comment, Statutes
Limiting Medical Malpractice Damages, 32 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 247, 250-57 (1982);
Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing
Limitation of Liability, 30 Loy. L. REv. 119 (1984).
179. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); Fitz v.
Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983); DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem.,
628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1979); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652
S.W.2d 836 (1983); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d
359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689
P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984); Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920,
695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, app. dism'd for want of federal question, 106 S.
Ct. 421 (1985); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, app. dism'd for want of federal question, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985);
Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981); LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422, 614
P.2d 962 (1980); Benier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 736 (1986); Anderson
v. Wagner, 79 I1. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), app. dismissed, Woodward v. Burham
City Hosp., 449 U.S. 807 (1980); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 584, 404
N.E.2d 585 (1980); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.S.2d 550 (Iowa
1980); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981); Everett
v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d
149 (La. 1985); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, app. dismissed,
439 U.S. 805 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977);
Linder v. Smith, - Mont. -, 629 P.2d 1187 (1981); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983);
Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981); Comiskey v. Arlen,
55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d
200 (1976); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d
875 (1982), aff'd., 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.,
67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981); Duffy v. King Chiropratic Clinic, 17 Wash. App. 693, 565 P.2d
435 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
Cf. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (remanded
to trial court for fact finding as to "crisis"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wentl-
ing v. Medical Anesthesia Serv., 237 Kan. 503, 701 P.2d 939 (1985); Carson v. Maurer,
120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978);
Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio Common Pleas); Boucher
v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1977).
180. Specifically, that such statutory provisions were violative of the guarantees
to be found at U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, cI. 2, and Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 2.
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defective (i.e., produces unequal treatment) and second, that such unequal
treatment is at odds legally with one or more constitutional guarantees.
In the case of the noneconomic damage ceiling and structured award
provisions of the new Missouri malpractice act, there is obvious unequal
treatment. First, under both statutory modifications, medical malpractice
victims are treated differently from other victims of negligent defendant
behavior. Second, within the class of malpractice victims there is now unequal
treatment. With regard to structured awards, plaintiffs who are to receive
more than $100,000 in total damages are to be treated differently from those
with less damages. With regard to the damage cap, plaintiffs awarded more
than $350,000 of noneconomic damages are to be treated differently from
those awarded a lesser amount.
Turning to the question of whether such factual defects violate (i.e., are
legally defective) equal protection guarantees, the key obviously is the level
of scrutiny utilized by the court. Of course, it is arguable that a judicial
decision as to the type of scrutiny is no more than a conclusory rationalization
of an "off-camera" decision either to uphold or invalidate the provision in
question. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, review should consist of a struc-
tured process involving three steps. First, what is the appropriate standard
of scrutiny to be utilized: strict scrutiny, intermediate review (substantial
relationship), or rational basis? Second, what is the substance of the test so
utilized; including within that substantive test, a determination of the burden
of proof? Third, what evidence will the court take into account in determining
governmental compliance with the appropriate standard of review?
It is accurate to state as a general proposition that malpractice crisis
legislation will attract the lowest level of review-the rational basis test.
Because the judiciary has not characterized personal injury litigation as a
"fundamental right," strict scrutiny is inapplicable.' 8' Furthermore, the in-
termediate standard of review has, in general, been eschewed by state courts
in the context of malpractice crisis legislation.'12 It is predicted therefore that
the Missouri courts will adopt the rational basis test in reviewing the new
malpractice act.' 83
Support for this position comes from the dissenting opinions of Judge
An analysis closely paralleling that suggested for equal protection would be under-
taken if review was undertaken under Mo. CoNsT. art. 40(6)-(30).
181. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980);
cf. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 971-75 (Ariz. 1984) (perhaps explicable on the
basis of very specific provisions contained in the Arizona Constitution).
182. Cf. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 178-79, 695 P.2d
665, 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 397-98 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Carson v. Maurer,
120 N.H. 825, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125,
133 (N.D. 1978).
183. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314-15 (Mo. 1968) (en
banc); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 116-17 (Mo. 1979) (Morgan, C.J., dissenting); Ross v. Kansas City Gen.
Hosp. & Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). For Missouri
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Blackmar and Judge Welliver in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital.8 4 The plu-
rality in Strahler struck down Missouri's malpractice statute of limitations
as it applies to minors on the basis of Missouri's guarantee of access to the
courts.'85 Neither Judge Blackmar nor Judge Welliver, however, construed
that guarantee as being absolute. Both saw the issue of constitutionality of
the statute of limitations as based on a balancing test.' 8 6 Thus, their ap-
proaches to that balancing process give some indication as to how they would
react to an equal protection challenge against the new malpractice act.
According to Judge Blackmar: "It is not for us to say whether there is
or is not a malpractice crisis. It is sufficient that the legislature may legiti-
mately concern itself with the possibility that health providers will be at severe
disadvantage if forced to defend themselves against claims based on long
past events."' 87 Judge Welliver was equally as forthright:
It is not the function of this Court to determine whether or not there exists
a malpractice crisis or a medical cost crisis. These are questions of legislative
fact for the people of this state to decide via their legislature. Nor do I
believe that it was irrational for the legislature to distinguish between minors
over ten and minors under ten.'88
One line of analysis may upset the prediction that the rational basis (lowest
tier) review standard will be utilized. The Missouri Constitution provides for
"certain remedy afforded for every injury to person." 1 89 This right of "cer-
tain remedy" has been described as "fundamental."'190 If held to encompass
non-interference with an award of damages determined by a jury, then a
strict scrutiny analysis may be still appropriate in the context of an equal
protection challenge.' 9'
decisions utilizing a rational basis test in the general context of personal injury liti-
gation, see Winston v. Reorganized School Dist., 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc); Crane v. Riehn, 568 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1978).
184. 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
185. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
186. Specifically, Judge Welliver saw the analysis as akin to that used in due
process challenges. Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 18 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 14 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 20 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
189. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
190. Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 449, 114 S.W. 997, 1004
(1908).
191. See, for example, White v. State, - Mont ... 661 P.2d 1272,
1275 (1983), holding that MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16, guaranteeing "speedy remedy
... for every injury of person, property, or character," assured fundamental right
status for "all recognized compensable components of injury, including the right to
be compensated for physical pain and mental anguish and the loss of enjoyment of
living," and, therefore, was subject to strict scrutiny analysis. A similar argument
failed in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La. 1985). See also State
Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Griffen, 651 S.W.2d 475, 479-80 (Mo.
1983) (en banc) (examples of fundamental rights given as "freedom of speech,"




Assuming, however, that the Missouri courts adopt the rational basis
standard of review, what is the substance of that standard? Although there
are a multitude of judicial expressions of the test, in practice they can be
summarized as falling within one of two general approaches: (1) the "rational
legislature" test and (2) the "rational legislation" test. The former is essen-
tially subjective, posing the questions whether a legislature could have en-
visaged a rational relationship between its unequal classification and its
legislative goals. 92 The latter has objective characteristics, moving toward an
intermediate scrutiny standard and examining the substance of the alleged
relationship between the legislation and the legislative goals.
93
Intimately linked to this choice between these approaches to determining
rational basis will be a court's view as to what evidence properly should be
considered. Thus, a court that applies the "rational legislation" variant will
be more interested in evidence as to whether, in practice, the legislation is
achieving its legislative goals.' 94 On the other hand, the application of the
"rational legislature" approach does not require evidence either of the success
or failure of the legislation'95 nor even of the very existence of the problem
(here, the malpractice "crisis") that it was designed to alleviate.'9 What little
authority there is suggests that, in the malpractice context at least, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court seems to lean toward the less rigorous "rational leg-
islature" approach. 97
If the court utilizes this less rigorous standard of review, it may well
decide that a rational legislature could have determined that Missouri was
faced with a malpractice crisis, thus justifying the unequal classification of
malpractice victims compared to negligence victims generally. This position
would comport with the views of Judge Welliver who, while dissenting in
Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital, stated: "I believe that the classification of
minors who are tort victims of a health care provider and minors who are
victims of other tortfeasors is rationally related to the legitimate state interest
of controlling malpractice insurance costs."'198
Furthermore, the unequal classifications within the new act, based on
the particular monetary amounts awarded, 'also could be seen as the products
of a rational legislature. With regard to the structured payments cut-off point
192. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d
359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
193. See, e.g., id. at 699 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
194. See, e.g., id. at 684-86 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., id. at 679 (Kaus, J.).
196. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 933, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980);
cf. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-345, slip op. at 2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Dec. 19,
1985) ("There is no empirical data to support the claim that a medical malpractice
insurance crisis exists in the State of Illinois."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 113 I1.
2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986).
197. See cases cited supra at note 183; see also State Bd. of Registration for
the Healing Arts v. Griffen, 651 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
198. Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 20 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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of $100,000, a rational legislature could have viewed the imposition of pe-
riodic payments in the case of small awards as not being worthwhile given
the attendant administrative costs that would be incurred by the parties and
the court. With regard to the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages, the
court might well conclude that a rational legislature may have considered
that it was particularly large malpractice awards that were the cause of rising
malpractice insurance premiums and threatened insurer withdrawal from the
Missouri market.
B. The Guarantee of "Certain Remedy"
Section 14 of the Missouri Bill of Rights provides: "That the courts of
justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every
injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."'19 It was on the basis of this
provision that the supreme court struck down Missouri's pretrial review panel
procedure in State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital v. Gaertner.
200
Cardinal Glennon turned on the importance the court attached to the right
of access to the courts, 20' and the specific constitutional prohibition against
delay found in section 14.202
With regard to Missouri's new noneconomic damages cap and, to a
lesser extent, structured payments provision, two questions arise for consid-
eration. First, will the court place as much weight on the "certain remedy"
guarantee as on the access to courts provision? Second, will "certain remedy"
be construed to include a guarantee of unlimited (or, in the case of the
structured payments provision, unfettered) personal injury quantum?
In 1908, the Supreme Court provided a provisional answer to that first
question when it described the guarantee of "certain remedy" as follows:
The constitution of our state guarantees liberty to every citizen, and a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character; and the rights so guaranteed are fundamental,
and can be taken away only by the law of the land, or interfered with, or
the enjoyment thereof modified, only by lawful regulations adopted as nec-
essary for the general public welfare.203
Far more difficult, however, is predicting the reach of the "certain remedy"
guarantee. It seems that a total denial of any remedy would run counter to
199. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
200. 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979). The case is further considered supra
note 14.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 111 (Simeone, J., concurring).
203. Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 449, 114 S.W.2d 997,
1004 (1908).
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the constitutional guarantee, 2°4 but would this be the case with a statutory
reduction of quantum? Case law from other jurisdictions suggests not. For
example, the Supreme Court of Idaho considered an argument that a medical
malpractice damage cap was invalid in the face of a constitutional provision
guaranteeing "a speedy remedy.., for every injury of person." 205 The court
concluded: "To adopt that argument would be to hold that the common law
as of 1890 governs the health, welfare and safety of the citizens of this state
and is unalterable without constitutional amendment. '206
Some light has been shed on the Missouri position by the supreme court's
recent decision in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital.20 7 The argument therein
concerned the constitutionality of the malpractice statute of limitations as
applied to minors. Clearly, the majority of the court analyzed the issue
presented as going to the "access to the courts" aspect of Article I, section
14.208 While both concurred in the majority opinions, Judge Billingsc 9 and
Judge Robertson 210 were careful to expressly exclude any prejudgment of the
new malpractice act's limitation on noneconomic damages.
Nevertheless, at least one explanation for Judge Welliver's well re-
searched dissent is that he foresaw the plurality's firm stance on a somewhat
absolutist approach to the "access to the courts" provision in Article I,
section 14 as being readily transferable to its "certain remedy" guarantee.
As he stated: "If it is unconstitutional to apply such a statute of limitation
to actions for malpractice, why it is not also unconstitutional to attempt to
limit the amount of recovery or place a cap on the amount of recovery in
medical malpractice actions? ' 21 1
204. Harryman v. L&N Buick-Pontiac, 431 S.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Mo. 1968);
De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 506, 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1931); see
also Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
205. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, -, 555 P.2d 399, 404
(1976).
206. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 404; see also Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462
So. 2d 149, 157 (La. 1985); cf. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, -, 688 P.2d 961,
971-75 (1984); White v. State, - Mont. ., -, 661 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1983).
207. 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
208. Id. at 9, 12 (Robertson, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 12 n.9 : "Questions concerning limiting the amount of recovery,'caps,' . . . are not before us in this case."
210. Id. at 12-13 (Robertson, J., concurring).
Nor does this decision necessarily portend ill for the legislature's current
effort to revamp the law of medical malpractice. That legislation is not
presently before us; we may not now judge its adherence to constitutional
standards. Those who would attack that legislation should find no greater
comfort in the principal opinion than already exists in Cardinal Glennon.
Id.
211. Id. at 20 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Beyond doubt, the concord and resulting legislation illustrate something
of a breakthrough in the formulation of medical malpractice crisis legislation.
The act is not without its technical problems and, in several instances, may
have failed to convey the intent of the negotiating parties. Its passage, how-
ever, coupled with the concord's four year moratorium on legislative action,
present to the Missouri legislature a unique opportunity: to study the work-
ings of the new act and its effect (if any) on malpractice insurance rates. In
1990, additional legislation may be necessary. When that time comes, the
legislature should insist that lawyers and doctors are to be joined at the
negotiating table by noncaptive insurers and representatives of patients' groups.
